Category Archives: Torah

[Source: Laws of Medical Treatment on Shabbat by R’Dov Karrol]

Does the approach cited above regarding the importance of saving the life of a fellow Jew, even if it means suspending the normal rules of Shabbat, apply to saving the life of a gentile? The Gemara (Avoda Zara 26a) rules that a Jew may provide medical treatment to an idolater during the week (provided he is paid for his efforts) but not on Shabbat. The Gemara states that the gentile will understand that one may only violate Shabbat for the care of those who are required to observe it. This is also the ruling cited in the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch [22] as well as the Mishna Berura.[23]

Many contemporary authorities have ruled that this principle is not applicable today, and I believe their views can be differentiated into two basic approaches.[24] The mainstream approach responds to the claim of the Gemara that gentiles will understand if Jews are unable to treat them on Shabbat, recognizing that Shabbat violation is only justified for the sake of those who are themselves Shabbat observers. Many authorities over the last few hundred years ruled that the understanding which the Gemara takes for granted cannot be assumed in modern society.[25] Rather, they claim, if Jews refuse to treat gentiles on Shabbat, this refusal could have disastrous ramifications, either for the doctor himself or for the Jewish community as a whole. As such, they rule that one should take whatever actions are necessary to save the life of a gentile, even if it requires violation of Shabbat laws. Within this approach, one should try to minimize the Shabbat violation required, and should only take those Shabbat violating actions that are truly necessary. Nonetheless, advocates of this approach generally assume that any violation is justified on the grounds that the deleterious consequences of nontreatment could themselves endanger the lives of Jews, and are thus to be understoodas piku’ach nefesh for Jews, which, as above, is permitted unconditionally. [26]

Alternatively, some authorities take a more principled approach to making this allowance in contemporary society, regardless of concern for the deleterious results of not saving gentile life. The mechanism for this approach is to limit the Gemara’s ruling to gentiles of the type that were common in the society of Talmudic times, i.e. idolaters, claiming that it is not applicable to the gentiles in our society. One source cited as a basis for this view is the Ramban, who counts helping and saving a ger toshav, a gentile who has accepted the seven Noahide laws, including violating Shabbat to save his life, as a mitzvah.[27] If one takes the position of the Ramban (and Rav Ahron Soloveichik points out that there are others who take this view as well), the question then remains whether contemporary gentiles are defined as gerei toshav. Rav Nachum Rabinovitch, rosh yeshiva of the Hesder Yeshiva in Maaleh Adumim and author of Melumedei Milchama, a book of responsa related to army service and security matters, applies the aforementioned principle of the Ramban, and cites authorities who rule that the gentiles of today are generally defined as gerei toshav. As such, he rules that saving the life of a gentile is warranted on Shabbat.[28] My teacher and rosh yeshiva Rav Aharon Lichtenstein of Yeshivat Har Etzion explained to me that while the views that take the first approach address the practical issue, justifying saving the life of a gentile under certain conditions, they sidestep the fundamental issue. Rav Lichtenstein said that were he to be confronted with a case of violating Shabbat to save the life of a gentile, he would act to save the life of the gentile on principle, relying on those views that allow for it in principle, not based on societal concerns alone. Rav Lichtenstein also mentioned that his rebbe and father-in-law, Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik, ruled that this was permissible even in cases where there would be no problem of negative results, independent of such issues.[29] Along similar lines, Rav Ahron Soloveichik cites numerous sources regarding the status of ben noach and ger toshav, leading to the conclusion that saving the life of a gentile is warranted based on the notion that saving the life of a gentile mandates Shabbat violation on substantive grounds.[30]

======================

[22] YD 154:2.

[23] Sec. 330:8, and in the Be’ur Halacha (330:2, s.v. kutit). The Mishna Berura decries the doctors who neglect this halacha and violate the laws of Shabbat to save gentile lives, which he says has no basis. Notwithstanding the very strong language of the Mishna Berura, there does seem to be good basis in poskim, both before and after the Mishna Berura, for doctors who act in this way. See the next paragraphs for details.

[24]  Clearly no poskim debate the validity of the reasoning of the above sources; the question is whether there is some change, either in the reaction of the gentiles to this perceived discrimination (as in the first approach), or in the status of the gentiles themselves (as in the second approach).

[25] The earliest source I found indicating this is Responsa Chatam Sofer (YD 131). Other sources include, but are not limited to, a teshuva by Rav Moshe Feinstein (Iggerot Moshe, OC 4:79), Rav Eliezer Waldenberg (Tzitz Eli’ezer, sec. 8, responsum 15, chap. 6, sec.12—it is a short paragraph from a very long teshuva on matters related to medical issues), and Rav Yitzchak Weiss (Minchat Yitzchak 1:53). A summary of this approach is found in the Piskei Teshuvot (330:2). (Note that there is a printer’s error in the citation of the teshuva from Iggerot Moshe, as it says 49 instead of 79. This is corrected above.)

[26] The Chatam Sofer mentions this as a possibility—if the ill-will could result in danger, then Torah-prohibited melachot are permitted. The Iggerot Moshe mentions this as a general concern, even if the individual doctor is not worried about his particular case, he raises a possible uproar resulting from this type of behavior, either on the part of the citizenry or the government. The Tzitz Eli’ezer explains that the doctor should have in mind that he is acting to save himself and Jewry in general from deleterious consequences rather than to save the gentile patient. The Minchat Yitzchak raises the possibility, mentioned by some of the aforementioned poskim as well, that the external pressures to perform the action lower it from a de-orayta to a de-rabbanan based on the principle of melacha she-einah tzericha le-gufah, a melacha performed for ulterior or abnormal purposes. Once it has been reduced to a de-rabbanan, he can permit based on the general rule of eiva, ill-will. While this understanding of the principle is itself controversial, it exemplifies the recognition that there needs to be a permit for melachot de-orayta.

[27]  “Omitted positive mitzvot,” listed in the Rambam’ s Sefer Ha-Mitzvot at the end of the mitzvot asei, mitzvah 16.

[28] Responsum 43, pp. 144–146. He states his opinion regarding an innocent Christian or Muslim (as opposed to a terrorist). He also claims that taking care of enemies in accordance with international regulations is also warranted to prevent ill-will toward Jews (along the lines of the first approach), a ruling for which he cites several sources.

[29] I heard Rav Lichtenstein express this idea in a tish in his home on Shabbat Parshat Lech-Lecha, 5762 (October 27, 2001). I followed up with him personally in the course of preparing this document, on 9 Tammuz 5763 (July 9, 2003).

[30] This idea is discussed in Od Yisrael Yosef Beni Chai, in the third article, titled “Be-inyan Mevakerin Cholei Akum mipenei Darkei Shalom,” on pp. 17–28. He cites numerous sources that support his claim, as well as explaining those which do not seem to fit this model at first glance. The sources regarding ger toshav include, in addition to the Ramban cited above, Rashi (Arachin 29b), Rabbeinu Yona, Sefer Yereim, Ra’avad (Hilchot Issurei Bi’a 14:8), the Ba’er Ha-Gola (CM 266, 425), the Aruch Ha-Shulchan (YD 254:3), the Rema (OC 156) with the Gra, ibid., and Rav Eliyahu Henkin (Ha-Darom 10, Elul 5719 [1959], pp. 5–9). The article, however, does not focus on the practical ruling. This information I heard from Rav Mosheh Lichtenstein, who told me in the name of the late Rabbi Dr. David Applebaum HYD, a very close student of Rav Soloveichik who was a practicing physician, that Rav Soloveichik told him that saving lives of gentiles is warranted even in the absence of the external concerns mentioned above. Thanks to Rav Mosheh Lichtenstein also for the reference to the article.

[31] Based on the Gemara Shabbat 53b, Rambam 21:20, Tur and Shulchan Aruch (328:1).

[32] Note the sources cited below, who deal with instances in which medicine is permitted and all maintain the assumption that there is a general problem. One example is Rav Moshe Feinstein’s view (Iggerot Moshe, OC 3:53).

Avtalyon would say: Scholars, be careful with your words. For you may be exiled to a place inhabited by evil elements [who will distort your words to suit their negative purposes]. The disciples who come after you will then drink of these evil waters and be destroyed, and the Name of Heaven will be desecrated.

Pirkei Avot – Chapter One, Eleven

This is something that I have been meaning to write about for a while, and although I know that this blog post is not going to do the topic justice, I want to get pen to paper and just allow a stream of conciousness to flow through.

What has prompted me to write on this:

• We are currently in the Nine days, the saddest time in Jewish History
• The recent murders of Leiby Kletzy, Rabbi Abuchatzeirah by Orthodox Jews
• The publication of books such as Torat Hamelech

• In short, Jews, Orthodox Jews have committed grievous crimes (murder, abuse, paedophilia) and caused great chillul hashem (fraud, theft, tax evasion, money laundering)  and we as a faith community have to take responsibility.
• Orthodox Jewish dialogue and leadership is forever focusing on the issue of the “ritual”, “chumrot”,”minhag” and not enough on universal, moral, human issues.
• Our educational system and mode of learning often leads to gray and fuzzy notions of right and wrong in areas where we should have a visceral reaction.  Murder, theft and fraud (of Jew and Gentile, regardless of gender, race, or religious/theological persuasion) should be issues where there is a “gut reaction”, a clear black and white that these behaviours are evil. These are not issues that you should  realise are wrong after you find them in a footnote to a footnote in a legal text.
• Many of these evils continue to perpetuate because unfortunately there are voices in our tradition that are being relied upon in practice, and in my opinion the true and correct majority voices are being droned out, not being brought to the surface.
• Our history, our tradition and our legal system, contain potentially dangerous laws  and episodes (Amalek, Apikorus, Rodef,Mesirah, Min, Moridin, etc) that if applied could lead to blood shed. Dangerous ideas in the wrong hands can lead to frightful consequences. There is not enough literature and public awareness of the danger of these texts and I am fearful of practical consequences. [Example sources below]
• Our response to all these issues is always reactive, apologetic and not proactive. Lets acknowledge wrong has been done, lets put in measures to make amends and ensure these kind of things do not happen again.

• First, acknowledgement that this is an issue. We need to change the focus and stop nit picking about “ritual issues” and focus on moral issues. There has to be an acknowledgement that moral issues are more important and that is where we currently failing, and like a reality tv show, our failures are blasted accross the international media.
• Second, lets take a forward thinking proactive response. We need books, shiurim, campains appropriate for all ages men, woman and child to install a revolution,  and prevent further moral evils.
• We need to ensure that our educational system emphasises these kind of issues, with clear direct guidance.
• As a first step I would like to see a “community” formed to discuss, promote and give  real life to some of these issues that plague us. A grass roots campaign, online, I think is the way to go.

Sources:

Dangerous Halachic Sources:

Mishne Torah –  Hilchot Rotzeach, Chapter 4, Halacha 10

It is a mitzvah to kill minim and apikorsim.

The term minim refers to Jewish idolaters or those who perform transgressions for the sake of angering God, even if one eats non-kosher meat for the sake of angering God or wears sha’atnez for the sake of angering God.

The term apikorsim refers to Jews who deny the Torah and the concept of prophecy.

If there is the possibility, one should kill them with a sword in public view. If that is not possible, one should develop a plan so that one can cause their deaths.

What is implied? If one sees such a person descend to a cistern, and there is a ladder in the cistern, one should take the ladder, and excuse oneself, saying: “I must hurry to take my son down from the roof. I shall return the ladder to you soon.” Similarly, one should devise other analogous plans to cause the death of such people.

Mishne Torah – Hilchot Mamrim, Chapter 3, Halacha 2

Since it has become known that such a person denies the Oral Law, he may be pushed into a pit and may not be helped out. He is like all the rest of the heretics who say that the Torah is not Divine in origin, those who inform on their fellow Jews, and the apostates. All of these are not considered as members of the Jewish people. There is no need for witnesses, a warning, or judges for them to be executed. Instead, whoever kills them performs a great mitzvah and removes an obstacle from people at large.

Mishne Torah – Hilchot Mamrim, Chapter 3, Halacha 11

With regard to a gentile idolater with whom we are not at war, a Jewish shepherd of small livestock, and the like, by contrast, we should not try to cause their deaths. It is, however, forbidden to save their lives if their lives are threatened. For example, if such a person fell into the sea, one should not rescue him. Leviticus 19:16] states: “Do not stand idly by while your brother’s blood is at stake.” This does not apply with regard to such individuals, because they are not “your brothers.”

The Danger is real

One believe more than any other (to quote a phrase of Isaiah Berlin’s) is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great historical ideals. It is the belief that those who do not share my faith – or my race or my ideology – do not share my humanity. At best they are second-class citizens. At worst, that forfeight the sanctity of life itself. They are the unsaved, the unbelievers, the infidel, the unredeemed; they stand outside the circle of salvation. If faith is what makes us human, than those who do not share my faith are less than fully human. From the pogroms, the blood of human sacrifice through the ages. From it – substituting race for faith – ultimately came the Holocaust.

Jonathan Sacks – The Dignity of Difference, Pg 45-46

Extract from an online Jewish Forum, Response by Rabbi Michael Broyde, Dayan, Beis Din of America

> 2 – According to the shulchan aruch, we pasken that we

> technically CAN kill homosexuals nowadays (harodef achar haarayos nitan

> lehaztilo).

This is a mistaken recitation of the halacha. The Shulchan Aruch (SH CM 425:3) is quite clearly limited to one who is running after an ervah to rape that person, and not a consensual sexual relationship. It is for that reason that halacha prohibits one from killing adulterers nowadays but would permit killing rapists (to prevent a rape). The same is true for other consensual — but halachically prohibited — sexual relationships; one may not kill them to prevent sin.

Given the times we live in, and ease of missunderstanding on matters of Jewish law, and the seriousness of the sin associate with killing human beings, it is extremely important that people check out the details of the halacha before they write.

Michael J. Broyde

The Slifkin Saga

In the introduction to Chapter 3, R. Schmeltzer explains that the chapter will deal with how doubting any of the words of Chazal, whether in halachah or Aggadah, is heresy. R. Schmeltzer takes the situation of such a “heretic” very seriously; in reference to this, he has a footnote quoting the Shulchan Aruch that one should bring about the death of such a person by any possible means.

Footnote: Does R. Schmeltzer genuinely believe that this should be done to people such as myself? If so, this is deeply problematic; if not, then it is extremely irresponsible for him to write such a thing, considering that there are individuals out there who take such recommendations seriously and see it as authorizing persecution, if not taking it as far as actual murder. In fact, since the publication of R. Schmeltzer’s book, I have received disturbing threats, by telephone and e-mail, not just against myself but even against my children. R. Schmeltzer and the rabbis who endorsed his work may have to shoulder some of the responsibility for such appalling acts.

Rewriting Jewish Intellectual History: A Review of Sefer Chaim Be’Emunasom Rabbi Natan Slifkin, Page 4

Why we are responsible:

Our hands did not spill this blood, and our eyes did not see… (21:7)

But would it enter one’s mind that the elders of the court are murderers? Rather, [they declare:] We did not see him and let him depart without food or escort. (Talmud, Sotah 45a)

The principle behind the law of Eglah Arufah is that a person is also responsible for what occurs outside of his domain — outside of the areas where he is fully in control. When a murdered traveler is found out in the field, the elders of the nearest city must go out there and bring the Eglah Arufah to atone for the crime, although it occurred “outside of their jurisdiction”; for it was nevertheless their responsibility to send the traveler off with adequate provision and protection.

The same applies on the personal level in all areas of life. A person never has the right to say, “This is outside of my element. I have no obligation to deal with this.” If it is something that, by Divine Providence, one has been made aware of, that means that there is something one can, and must, do to positively influence the end result.

(The Lubavitcher Rebbe)

[Source: http://www.chabad.org/global/popup/default_cdo/aid/56735/a/Shoftim21_07b/jewish/Parshah-Commentary.htm]

A step in the right direction:

See here for a thoughtful response to the Torat Hamelech book that captures many of the above sentiments – Affirming the Image of God: Statement of Scholars of the Jewish Theology Project of the Elijah Interfaith Institute

A somewhat stronger response was penned by R’David Rosen – A disturbing desecration of Jewish values

Amazing 15 Part Lecture on the Beards, Peyos, Elecrtric shavers, etc – literally everything you would want to know on the topic by Rav Baruch Simon of YU. Includes lecture handout notes.

The Halachos of Beard and Peyos

Also see the previous 4 entries on the topic

• Electric Shaver part 1
• Electric Shaver part 2
• Electric Shaver Part 3
• Electric Shaver Part 4

After writing up my post an Oath to Sin  (Part 1), I decided to formulate a question to Kollel Eretz Hemda in Israel. Here is their response.

Question:

Hi, I have got a couple of questions regarding the halachot of making an shevua in halacha.

1) If a person had to say in English "I promise …" would that make it a shevua? Does the persons intent or whether or not he wishes for it to be a shevua have an impact or is purely the terminology of language. (I have heard different opinions on this matter)

2) It seems that halachically speaking a person can make an oath to commit a sin and that oath would take effect. Two examples that illustrate that point to me are: Jepthah and his daughter ((Judges Chapter 11, verses 29 – 40) and a case brought by the Rambam (Hilchot Shavuot 5:17) where a person makes an oath to harm himself.These cases both seem very strange to me and quite frankly quite dangerous, how can these shevuoat take effect?

Letting my imigination run wild and going along the same theme, if a person would make an oath to treat a  irriligious jew like the din of an akum, would that shevua take effect? If he made a shevua to follow the halacha as paskened by the Rambam in hilchot mamrim chapter 3 of the obligation to kill the apikorus what that shevua take effect?

As mentioned, the above seems very strange and quite dangerous from a moral perspective, but yet it seems to me that such shevuat could take effect based on the above mentioned sources. Seems very dangerous to me, what are your thoughts on the matter?

Answer:

One would receive lashes only for an oath in which one mentions the Divine Name. However,  even if one doesn’t mention the Divine Name or name referring to Hashem- it is still prohibited.

1.             One accepts an oath by uttering an expression that is used to mean an oath. There is no need for the dictionary definition to explain the words to be an oath. Rather, any word that one is accustomed to use in order to say that one has taken an oath is considered an oath.

From here it is derived that a mere promise isn’t within the framework of an oath. Similarly, an expression of ‘I promise’ isn’t an oath, but rather a promise.

2.             Hashem decided to give us power to effect the world. He allowed us free will, and gave us the power of speech, that has the added power toprohibit objects from ones use, and obligate one to do certain actions.

This power isn’t limited to doing good. That’s why it is possible to take an oath that is unethical or that causes evil to someone.

The reason why it is impossible to take an oath on a mitzvah is because that we have all sworn at Mt. Sinai to keep the mitzvoth, and an oath does not take effect on a [preexisting] oath, not because it is bad to sin. An oath therefore takes effect if a person has sworn to harm himself, since it isn’t explicitly mentioned in the Torah that it forbidden to injure oneself.

Regarding Yiftach, the commentators have already written that he was mistaken, and the vow did not take effect.

3.             In our times, the majority of Acharonim view Sabbath violators as Tinok She’nishba (literally- children taken into captivity, and therefore cannot be expected to know Halakhah. The term expresses that they cannot be liable for their sins), One who has sworn to kill a Sabbath desecrator (or to push him into a pit) is one who has sworn to perform a transgression. Therefore, the oath does not take effect.

With Torah Greetings from Israel

And Blessings from the Rabbis of Eretz Hemda

There was a recent post on the Hirhurim blog entitled “Swearing in Court ” that got me contemplating some contemporary usage of "oaths" in our religion. Off the cuff here are a couple of interesting items that I have come up with:

•    The famous “Three Oaths” are a major corner stone of the theological debate between those who support and those who oppose the establishment of the medina. (See the discussion in Rav Shlomo Aviner's "Do not ascend like a wall ")

•    Using oaths as a mechanism of creating “mitzvahs” to solve issues of egalitarianism. [See the post “Voluntary Obligations ” where Prof Joel Roth proposes that oaths can be used by woman to give them the same halachic obligations and rights as men]

However it got me thinking, can Oaths be used to create obligations to sin? As a case in point, what of the episode of Jepthah and his daughter?

29 Then the spirit of the LORD came upon Jephthah, and he passed over Gilead and Manasseh, and passed over Mizpeh of Gilead, and from Mizpeh of Gilead he passed over unto the children of Ammon. 30 And Jephthah vowed a vow unto the LORD, and said: 'If Thou wilt indeed deliver the children of Ammon into my hand, 31 then it shall be, that whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of my house to meet me, when I return in peace from the children of Ammon, it shall be the LORD'S, and I will offer it up for a burnt-offering.' 32 So Jephthah passed over unto the children of Ammon to fight against them; and the LORD delivered them into his hand. 33 And he smote them from Aroer until thou come to Minnith, even twenty cities, and unto Abel-cheramim, with a very great slaughter. So the children of Ammon were subdued before the children of Israel. 34 And Jephthah came to Mizpah unto his house, and, behold, his daughter came out to meet him with timbrels and with dances; and she was his only child; beside her he had neither son nor daughter. 35 And it came to pass, when he saw her, that he rent his clothes, and said: 'Alas, my daughter! thou hast brought me very low, and thou art become my troubler; for I have opened my mouth unto the LORD, and I cannot go back.' 36 And she said unto him: 'My father, thou hast opened thy mouth unto the LORD; do unto me according to that which hath proceeded out of thy mouth; forasmuch as the LORD hath taken vengeance for thee of thine enemies, even of the children of Ammon.' 37 And she said unto her father: 'Let this thing be done for me: let me alone two months, that I may depart and go down upon the mountains, and bewail my virginity, I and my companions.' 38 And he said: 'Go.' And he sent her away for two months; and she departed, she and her companions, and bewailed her virginity upon the mountains. 39 And it came to pass at the end of two months, that she returned unto her father, who did with her according to his vow which he had vowed; and she had not known man. And it was a custom in Israel, 40 that the daughters of Israel went yearly to lament the daughter of Jephthah the Gileadite four days in a year.

(Judges Chapter 11, verses 29 – 40)

Another example, is this din in the Mishna Torah (Hilchot Shavuot 5:17). "If a man swore to harm himself, eg he swore to wound himself, even though it is not permissible to wound oneself, if he did not harm himself, he is guilty because of Shavuat Bituy". 

The above scenarios seem to create a "Catch 22". On the one hand you made an oath to do x, but on the other hand that x is a sin. Quite clearly killing your daughter or harming yourself is sin. So how can it take effect? Also how would a person get out of it? Imagine going to the beis din and saying "Rabbis I made an oath to kill my daughter, but had I known its a sin I wouldn't have done it" – Muttar lach, muttar lach, muttar lach, they all respond. It just seems quite ridiculous. Any thoughts from some of the more learned readers?

To be continued….

Regarding the Nochri's obligation to learn and to fulfill the seven Mitzvos of Benei Noach and his liability if he does not do so, about which we responded in a previous discussion, there is a remarkable Chidush in "His'orerus ha'Teshuvah" of Rebbi Shimon Sofer (Budapest, published between 1923 and 1934; vol. 4, Yoreh De'ah #186). He writes as follows (translation):

"He is 'Karov l'Mezid,' considered to have sinned intentionally, since he should have learned and he did not learn, as the Rambam writes. In my humble opinion, this applies only when we are living in our land and we
have governing control, and all those who live among us are either Gerei Toshavim (who accepted upon themselves the seven Mitzvos of Benei Noach), or they are Nochrim whom we must put to death, as the Rambam writes
(Hilchos Melachim 8:10). Consequently, the Nochri who transgresses any of the seven Mitzvos should have learned from what he saw around him — all of the other Nochrim acting as Gerei Toshavim and observing the seven Mitzvos.

That Nochri certainly knows how the other Nochrim around him are conducting themselves as he hears and sees them himself, and thus he certainly should have learned from them.

However, now, when we are in exile, the Nochri [who transgresses the seven Mitzvos] has not heard nor has he seen nor does he know anything about the seven Mitzvos saw. Hence, from where should he have learned about the seven
Mitzvos and about his obligation to observe them, if he has never heard of them? Even though we are not permitted to cause him to transgress them because of 'Mipnei Iver,' nevertheless he is an absolute Shogeg. Proof to
this can be found in the Rambam who writes (in Hilchos Mamrim 3:3) that those Karaites who were raised by their fathers in a way of falsehood, even though they hear afterwards about the laws of the Jewish nation, they are considered as though they sin against their will (Anusim) and they have the status of 'a baby who was taken captive among the Nochrim….' Further proof to this can be found in the Ra'avad and Kesef Mishnah (in Hilchos Avodah Zarah 10:6).

With regard to forming free-loan societies for the Nochrim, it can be said that this is a Mitzvah and there is reward for doing so, and that these things should be done because of the Kidush Hashem involved and the recognition of the greatness of the faith of the Jews who do good for all. Indeed, the verse says, 'Hashem is good to all and His mercy is upon all of His creations' (Tehilim 145:9), and it says, 'Her (the Torah's) ways are ways of pleasantness, and her paths are of peace' (Mishlei 3:17)."

Source: http://www.mail-archive.com/daf-discuss@shemayisrael.com/msg00137.html

Other sources:

• The Obligation of Jews to Seek Observance of Noachide Laws by Gentiles: A Theoretical Review by Rabbi Michael J. Broyde
• Shiurium on the topic of "Non Jews " on YUTorah.org, in particular I recommend the series by Rabbi Hanan Balk on this topic

I stumbled upon the following shiurim on YUTorah.

• The Perfection Paradox I: An in-depth textual analysis of Rabbi A. Y. Kook
• The Perfection Paradox II: An in Depth Textual Analysis of Rabbi A. Y. Kook

The speaker is Rabbi David Aaron of the Isralight Institute. I am quite impressed and highly recommend them. Feel free to share your thoughts in the comments section.

This was a question that I sent through to Kollel Eretz Chemda . Below is the response they sent me. It can also be found posted on their website . In short (the way I understand it), no afros but anything less than that is probably ok.

Question: I have heard that there is an issue with long hair being a chatzitza (problematic separation) with regard to tefillin shel rosh. What is the halachic cut off point?

Answer: Some poskim say that long hair is a chatzitza for tefillin. However, regarding most cases of long hair, these opinions are difficult, and the length is not the main issue, as we will see.

One puts the tefillin shel rosh where the hair grows (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 27:9). As one is not required to shave his head frequently, hair could not possibly be a chatzitza regarding tefillin. Why not? The gemara (Zevachim 19a) discusses whether hair from the head that hangs down between the kohen’s clothes and his body is a chatzitza and does not resolve the question. On this backdrop, the Machatzit Hashekel (27:4, cited by the Mishna Berura 27:15) says that a blorit (probably, a clump of hair in the front of the head) is a chatzitza for tefillin. He says that, for a blorit, one cannot apply the rule that anything that exists normally (r’vitayhu) is not a chatzitza because it is “abnormally big.” Presumably, if the hair whose roots are in the tefillin’s location are combed down neatly to one’s waist, it would not be a problem because the part of the hair that the tefillin is on is the same as it would be if he cut the long part. The problem would be only if at the point where the tefillin sit there was noticeably more hair than expected. If one wanted to be strict, a relatively conservative side part could be more of a problem than long hair with a middle part (see the Aruch Hashulchan, OC 27:14). We have not heard people being careful about the former.

Igrot Moshe (OC IV, 40.18) goes further, saying that transplanted hair is not a chatzitza, since it cannot be removed from the head without cutting (unlike a toupee) and the person wants it to be there. Rav O. Yosef (Yechave Da’at II, 2) points out that mourners have to grow their hair at least for thirty days and some do so for twelve months, yet the poskim do not warn about tefillin. He also points out that there is a double doubt pointing that hair is not a problem of chatzitza, as the Rashba (Shut III, 282) also suggests that chatzitza is a problem for tefillin shel yad but not shel rosh.

There are two areas in which some poskim’s concerns raise serious questions of chatzitza specifically for people who, by our standards, have long hair. One is that on the sides of the head where the straps of the shel rosh hold down the tefillin, there could be several layers of hair, much of which would not be there at all if his hair was of normal length. Be aware that, on one hand, the Rama (OC 27:4) says that chatzitza applies only to the boxes of the tefillin, not the straps. On the other hand, the Mishna Berura (27:16) says in the name of “the Acharonim” that one should not be lenient in regard to the part of the straps that are used to fasten the tefillin to the body. Another issue is raised by the Mishna Berura (27:15). He says that, in addition to problems of chatzitza, a lot of hair can prevent the tefillin from being secured in the right place. Apparently, he means that the tefillin are supposed to be on the head, which may be accomplished even if there is hair in between. It is not supposed to be sitting on a clump of hair, which happens to be supported by the head (see Shulchan Aruch ibid.:5 who distinguishes between a thick and a thin hat). Sometimes, especially regarding those with curly long hair, the tefillin don’t seem to be resting on the head to any significant degree.
In summary, in all but the most extreme cases presented above, there is ample reason to say that long hair does not prevent the fulfillment of the mitzva of tefillin. We would note that many of the poskim who raised the issue combat the phenomenon of long hair for males (primarily?) based on other halachic, social, and philosophical elements (see Bemareh Habazak V, 25).

For additional sources and reference material see the links on this site .

This is continuation of the "Electric Shaver" series (see the archives under the "Halacha Posts" section on the right hand column). I came across some very interesting sources in the book Women and Mitzvot vol 2  by Rabbi Getsell Ellinson (Pg 234 – 235), the page available online here :

 Hiddushe Ha-Ritva, Makkot 21a:

The Rabbis taught, "When the Torah forbade shaving the beard… it meant with a razor." Legally, as long as scissors are used, even razor-like ones, it is permissible. Still, to refrain from doing so, and thereby to avoid arousign suspicions of wrongdoing, is a pious act, and such is the worthy course of action.

Responsa, Hattam Sofer, Orah Hayyim, 149

Regarding opposition to shaving, I do not understand what all the uproar is about. Let us consider for a moment. Shaving cannot be called a non-jewish practice… for this point appears neither in the Talmud or the Poskim. In fact, there is not historical evidence that in ancient times, Jew and non-Jew were distinguished by whether they shaved, for all the nations used to grow beards.

As for the Cabalists who said that one should not “lay a hand” on ones beard at all, I am no expert on Cabalistic literature, but they and their legions throughout Italy seem to have dispensed with this stricture entirely. All the Cabalists there are clean-shaven, and they rely for precedent upon the Great Tree, Father of the Cabalists, Rabbi Menachem Azariah, who was clean-shaven as well.

Our ancestors were compelled during the persecutions of 1096 to conduct themselves the same way. The rabbis allowed Jews taking long trips to alter their dress and to shave off their beards so that their enemies would not recognize them as Jewish. By then, non-Jews were already shaving off their beards, and these Jews would be greatly ridiculed when returning home. The custom therefore spread of not growing beards at all… While shaving originally violated the prohibition of non-Jewish practices [1], once it became customary among Jews, it no longer involved the least hint of wrongdoing. As for the user of razor-like scissors, that involves an unrealistic fear [2] One who follows the strict view is a saint.

[1]  From his precise wording he appears to hold they we many not taking into account Jewish customs with forbidden origins for the purpose of making permissible those acts forbidden as non-jewish practices. … It should be noted that in the transcription of his responsum in Darkei Teshuva 181:17, a significant error appear. Instead of Ilui (“While”), we find Ulai (“Perhaps”). This is enough of an error to make Hattam Sofers point unclear. Generally one should not rely upon abridged quotations, but should examine the original.

[2]  That one of the blades will press against the skin by itself, making it like a razor. Some, however to regard very sharp scissors with suspicion. See Responsa Terumat ha-desheh 295; Darkei Moshe, Yoreh Deah 181:5 Rema ad loc 181:10

My Commentary:

The above response of the Chatam Sofer is very surprising to me. If there is anyone I would have imagined who would have been “pro-beard” it would have been the father of the mantra “Chadash osur min hatorah”.  Not quite sure what to make of it quite frankly.

Also interesting is his comment (perhaps) that even if something was originally a sin (ie the jews first removing their beards, violating chukkas-hagoyim) once enough people start doing it and it becomes a “minhag” so to speak, the next generation of people who follow it are not committing any sin at all.

Similiar to this point see this drasha by Rav Kook on Sukkot  http://www.ravkooktorah.org/SUKKOT59.htm  “The Boethusians and the Willows”

This particular responsa of the Chatam Sofer was also subject to controversy over its claim that Rabbi Menachem Azariah was clean shaven. See the article "Jews. Beards and Portraits " on the Seforim blog for further insight into this issue.